In April 1998 Poland began the access negotiations with the European Union. It is generally agreed in Poland that the possible joining the EU is a modernization challenge on a historical scale (Kuklinski 1995, W'c'awowicz 1996). The scope of this paper is related with two main intellectual areas, i.e. the spatial consequences of Poland's access to the EU and the general awareness of the EU's economic, political and social structure.

Changes in the structure of Poland's economic space in the nearest twenty years depend on to what extent Poland will be able to meet the security challenge, related with her possible membership in NATO, and the modernization or civilizational challenge, related with her access to the EU. Importantly, in both cases Poland has already been invited to negotiations, in neither case the access processes have, however, succeed yet.


THE GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE EU IN POLAND

The prevailing surveys of the public opinion in Poland indicated a considerable social support to the project of Poland's access to the European Union. The survey made by the Centre of the Investigation of Social Opinion (CBOS) in June 1997 indicated that 77% of the public supported Poland's access to the EU, 7% were against and 16% were undecided (quoted after "Rzeczpospo- lita", 225 (4782) from 26 September 1997). In September 1997, 72% of respondents were for Poland's integration with the EU, 12% were against and 16% were undicided (Opinie..., 1997).

Those figures seem to indicate massive, although slowly diminishing, support for the Polish integration with the Union. It might be suspected, however, that the support applies to the rather general ideas of "Poland's return to Europe" while the de facto economic, social and political problems of and mechanisms in the Union are hardly known. The same may be said about the potential economic, social and spatial consequences of the possible Poland's access to the EU. It may, therefore, be presumed that the confrontation of the hopes and expectations related to the integration, on the one hand, with the concrete settlements of the access negotiations, on the other, might result in a decrease in the number of the adherents of Poland's integration with the Union (Opinie..., 1997).

There are no serious political parties in Poland who would question the sense of purpose of Poland's integration with the EU. Two basic option, however, exist of the way and speed of the integration. These are: (1) one which assumes the possible fastest integration as a precondition of the acceleration of Poland's modernization; and (2) one which suggests that the process of modernization should precede the integration (Opinie..., 1997). A considerable fraction of respondents, i.e. about one third, is unable to indicate the consequences of the integration with the Union for themselves and their families (Opinie..., 1997). This development seems to support the opinion that while the belief in the integration as an element of the Polish raison d'etat is grounded, the awareness of the concrete directly felt consequences of the Polish membership in the Union is rather limited. The integration appears, therefore, as abstract and hardly imaginable in terms of personal gains and loses.


THE ROLE OF INNOVATORY ATTITUDES

In the process of modernization, the role of innovations and innovatory attitudes should be appreciated. A differential relation of individual regions to innovation processes seems a good point of departure for the analysis of the differentiation of their developmental chances on the turn of millenia. This development results from the fact that innovatory attitudes in firms and regions underlay their adaptability and thus competitiveness.

Four types of regions were traditionally identified in the context of their innovatory attitudes (Rykiel 1998b), i.e. innovatory, adaptative, imitative and skansenic regions. Innovatory regions form a strict vanguard in the global process of change. It is there that technological, economic and social innovations are being created. There are no such regions in Poland and few, if any, in Europe (Kuklinski 1997a).

Adaptative regions are ones in which conditions exist to accept, adapt and diffuse innovations created elsewhere, i.e. in the innovatory regions.

Immitative regions are destinations of the diffusion of innovations which reach those regions from adaptative regions after a considerable time lag. In the immitative regions, innovations are rarely adapted and developed while more often they are absorbed in their original form. The neglectfulness of the local peculiarities in the process of the absorption of innovations is responsible for their limited, if not hardly any, usefulness.

Skansenic regions generally lay beyond the mainstream of the processes of change and innovation diffusion. It is these regions which are not reached by innovations or ones in which innovations are not accepted, in both cases as a result of the resistance of the respective local milieux. Megalomania, commonly accompanied by xenophobia, used to be an important reason of the resistance; these result from justifiable or, more often, unjustifiable belief about a unique contribution of the own region in the creation and diffusion of innovations in the past.

In the economies under transformation, a special type of economic innovations is worth to emphasize, viz. one which can be categorized as new economic phenomena. It is referred to here to the phenomena and institutions which, although obvious or common in the market economy, did not exist in the communist system, were limited in number or at least performed rather different functions. Commercial banks, stock exchange, stockbrokers' desks, commercial insurance companies, exchange counters and hier shops can be included in this category, to limit the considerations to finance (Rykiel 1996).


FACTORS OF CHANGE IN POLAND'S REGIONAL STRUCTURE OR SPATIAL ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES

The perspective of the Polish access to the European Union will certainly result in differential advantages to individual economic sectors, branches and regions. Even though the renunciation to join the EU by Poland can result in negative consequences for the national future in general, in can be positive for both some social groups (Kuklinski 1997b) and some regions. From this perspective, three categories can be identified, i.e. spatial chances, threats and challenges (Rykiel 1998a).

Those regions were included in the category of spatial chances whose absolute or relative economic role is expected to grow after the Polish access to the EU. It is the adaptative and innovative regions, if any, that are expected to got spatial chances. These areas can be said to be doomed to success.

In the category of spatial challenges those regions were included whose absolute or relative economic role may grow after the Polish access to the EU, provided, however, that efforts will be made to make use of the local advantages in the new conditions on the continental scale. One cannot promise, however, that those regions will succeed, especially if the challenge would not be faced. It is the immitative regions that are expected to face spatial challenges. The challenges are expected to apply to tourism, the trade with the East (i.e. post-Soviet realm), highly productive agriculture and modern industry.

Spatial threats apply to those regions whose absolute or relative economic role is likely to decline after the Polish access to the EU. In this sense it is the skansenic regions that can expect spatial threats. These areas can be said to be doomed to fail on the European common market.

The spatial pattern of the three categories was discussed elswhere (Rykiel 1998a). Generally, the spatial chances cover three areas: (1) the meridional belt from Gdansk through Bydgoszcz and Poznan to Wroc'aw and Opole; (2) the parallel developmental axis from the Polish-German boundary crossing at Frankfurt(Oder)/S'ubice through Poznan and Lodz to Warsaw and (3) the Carpathians, especially the western part. These areas' advantages are based on highly productive agriculture, extensively developing commerce, and mobile and qualified labour, respectively.

The spatial challenges, applicable to the four main branches, covers the following areas: (1) the Baltic sea shore, the Mazurian and Suwa'ki Lake Districts, and the Sudetes Mountains in tourism; (2) the potential developmental axis from Warsaw to the Polish-Belarusian boundary crossing at Terespol/Brest in the trade with the East; (3) the Lublin and southern part of the Kielce regions in agriculture, based on fertile though now very traditionally cultivated soils; and (4) the Katowice region in industry as an extensive labour and consumer market, with highly qualified labour, on the one hand, but the oversized mining which badely needs conversion, on the other.

The spatial threats applies to the frontier regions which would be disadvantaged by the de facto liquidation of the economic border in the west and the growing foreign competitiveness in the east. Also depressed areas in western Poland and underdeveloped areas in eastern and central Poland could be covered by spatial threats.


THE PERCEPTION OF THE SPATIAL RESULTS OF THE POLISH ACCESS TO THE EUROPEAN UNION

The spatial chances, threats and challenges were investigated empirically. The expected spatial results of the possible joining the EU by Poland were analysed by a questionnaire inquiry surveyed in Greater Poland (the Poznan voivodship) and reported in detail elsewhere (Rykiel 1998b).

The author wish to thank Dr. Roman Matykowski for the conducting the survey and processing of numerical data.

Asked to point to the advantages of the Polish access to the EU, the respondents indicated a wide spectrum of the advantages. The expected economic growth, the inflow of foreign investments and credits, new technologies, industrial development, new outlets, the development of trade and the opening of borders were among the most frequently indicated (Rykiel 1998b).

When asked to indicate the threats which may result from the Polish access to the EU, the respondents answered the most frequently that there were no threats like those at all. Few respondents pointed to threats like the collapse of small farms, the swarming over the Polish market with EU products, presumably trashy, and the growth in crime (Rykiel 1998b). Asked to name the regions which are expected to gain after the access to the EU, the respondents the most frequently pointed to the "western voivodships" in general. More particularly, they indicated, in historical terms, Greater Poland and Silesia or, in administrative terms, the Poznan voivodship but, interestingly, also the eastern voivodships (Rykiel 1998b).

On the contrary, when asked to name the regions which are expected to lose after the access to the EU, the respondents indicated hardly any area but "the eastern voivodships" or even did not hesitate to maintain that no Polish regions would lose after the integration with the Union (Rykiel 1998b).

The rather one-sided view of the expected results of the Polish access to the EU was supported by the analysis of answers to a closed question about the expected advantages of the access. Respondents were to indicate, in a five-level scale, whether the Polish access to the EU would be advantageous for individual branches of the economy and aspects of societal organization.

When analysing average scores given by the respondents to each of the eleven items in question, it was found that none of those was evaluated as decidedly advantageous in the context of the integration with the Union (i.e. scored 4.5 or over). Seven items were evaluated as rather advantageous (scored 3.5 to 4.5); these were: tourism (4.49), trade (3.86), the Polish consumer (3.83), economy in general (3.80), industry (3.78), security of citizenships (3.62), and living standard (3.61). Four items were evaluated as neutrally advantageous (or partly yes, partly no), i.e. scored 2.5 to 3.5; these were: social security (3.49), craftsmanship (3.12), agriculture (3.09), and the Catholic church (2.67). No items were evaluated as rather disadvantageous (scored 1.5 to 2.5) or decidedly disadvantageous (under 1.5).

Generally, the expected advantages of the Polish access to the EU considerably prevail over the expected disadvantages. Interestingly, however, this general pattern is being applied to spatial categories. This is to say that all Polish regions are perceived as potential gainers and hardly any as potential losers. This pattern may result in confusion, if not frustration, when it is made clear that the de facto integration with the Union will involve not only advantages but also disadvantages, producing both spatial gainers and spatial losers.


THE POLISH PERCEPTION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

While much attention is paid to the expected advantages related with the Polish access to the EU, the respective threats and challenges are hardly noticeable. The latter two are related to the civilizational gap between Poland and the UE member states, the gap which used to be underestimated in Poland. The differences in legal, economic and social standards are among the especially highly underestimated components of the gap.

The Polish perception of the European Union seemed, therefore, both interesting and important. It was hypothesized that the generally positive attitude of Poles towards the proposed Polish access to the EU may be one result of a limited or at least superficial knowledge of the Union. The question about basic facts concerning the Union seems, therefore, important to ask.

In this paper, results of the survey based on a questionnaire inquiry made in Greater Poland are reported. The survey, made in the summer of 1997, included almost 250 answered questionnaires. Two main questions are analysed herein, i.e. (1) that related with the general knowledge of the EU and her member states, and (2) that of the differences and similarities between Poland and the Union as based on a semantic differential.

For the knowledge of the EU, the question about the typical member states of the Union seems indicative. As can be seen in Table 1, Germany and France are the most commonly recognized as typical member states of the Union. Several reasons seem to account for this pattern. These include the size, economic potential, the founder members status of the EEC and the relative proximity from Poland. In both cases the indication level exceeded 40%; interestingly, however, it was twice as high in rural than urban areas.

Every fourth respondent did not indicate any typical EU member state. Interestingly, quite a proportion of the respondents from smaller towns indicate Switzerland as a typical EU member state. Individual respondents indicated even the United States which were perceived as a typical EU member state to a proportion only slightly lower than Denmark. A simple explanation of this fact is that some respondents stereotype the EU and hardly differentiate between the EU and NATO membership.

A semantic differential was used to measure the perceived differences and similarities between Poland and the Union. Twenty pairs of adjectives were provided to the respondents who were expected to evaluate, separately, the European Union and Poland in a five-level scale. Five represented the total agreement with the charateristic suggested by the left-handed adjective while one represented the similar situation of the right-handed adjective. Results can be seen in Table 2.

To identify the perceived characteristics of the European Union and Poland, respectively, the distance from three as a begining of the coordinates should be counted. After doing this, characteristics of the EU were identified out of the twenty pairs of adjectives. In the first group of the characteristics those can be included which could be categorized as explicit and scored one or over. Following characteristics can be included in this group: modern (1.58), rich (1.46), urban (1.28), laborious (1.27), democratic (1.26), educated (1.19), economical (1.09), industrial (1.06), clean (1.05), cultural (1.02), bourgeois (1.01), and multicultural (1.01). In the second group of the characteristics those can be included which could be categorized as implicit and scored less than one. Legal (0.93), reliable (0.82), and safe (0.60) can be included in this group while the characteristics scored less than 0.50 can be categorized as meaningless. Industrial, secular, cosmopolitan, anticlerical and unfamiliar can be included in the latest group.

As a result of the confrontation of the perceived characteristics of the EU and Poland, the contrast profile between the two can be analysed, as indicated in Table 2. Four natural classes can be identified: (1) that of a very clear contrast, scored over three in absolute values (>/3/); (2) that of a clear contrast, scored between two and three in absolute values (/2/-/3/); (3) that of not so clear contrast, scored between one and two in absolute values (/1/-/2/); (4) that of an unclear contrast, scored under one in absolute values (</1/).

No single pair of adjectives provides a very clear contrast between the EU and Poland. Only one pair of adjectives provides a clear contrast, i.e. rich/poor. Eleven pairs of adjectives provides not so clear contrasts; these include: modern/backward, homogeneous/multicultural, industrial/agricultural, economical/- wasteful, clean/dirty, religious/secular, labourious/lazy, urban/- rural, educated/uneducated, familiar/unfamiliar, and bourgeois/- proletarian. The final eight pairs of adjectives provides unclear contrasts between the EU and Poland; these are: reliable/- unreliable, legal/illegal, cultural/uncultural, safe/unsafe, democratic/autocratic, clerical/anticlerical, industrial/postindustrial, and nationalist/cosmopolitan.

Interestingly, many respondents were uncertain about the evaluation of two pairs of adjectives, i.e. industrial/post- industrial and bourgeois/proletarian. The terms used in these cases seem to have been too sofisticated to be evaluated by the respondents. Especially the latter of the two appeared to apply more to historical than contemporary society. On the contrary, the clerical/anticlerical pair was evaluated unwillingly, as usual whenever religious attitudes are discussed publicly.

The results of the analyses seem to provide more information about the investigated regional community than the de facto contrasts between Poland and the European Union. Greater Poland is among the nationally leading Polish regions in the process of the system's transformation. Relatively high living standard, well developed education, advanced postindustrialism, low unemployment, high level of civil self-organization, proximity to the German market, the historical experience of rather successful confrontation with the Prussian/German state supported economy, and, last but not least, the consciousness of being the Polish nuclear core, all these account for the lack of inferiority complex to the West, on the one hand, and the awareness of the modernization gap between Poland and the European Union, on the other.

It should be remembered that the referred to here perception of the European Union applies in every other case to Germany, or, in rural areas, even in three cases for four.


CONCLUSIONS

As was already indicated, the access to the European Union is a modernization challenge for Poland on a historical scale. However, Poland, if joined the EU, would be among the economically weakest members of the expanded Union. In this context, individual Polish regions may appear the gainers, losers or challengers of the expansion.

During the adjustment to come innovatory attitudes would be of great importance. If Poland is to span the modernization gap which expanded over the recent fifty years, a good information about the economic, political and social reality of the EU is needed as well as extensive engagement of local and regional communities in the adjustment process. The confrontation, i.e. both competition and cooperation, with the closest EU member states may result in better developmental chances when the access to the Union suceeds.


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