'The anxiety would be lessened, tensions allayed, the total situation made more comfortable were the stunning profusion of possibilities somewhat reduced, were the world a bit more singular, its occurances more repetitive, its parts better marked and separated: in other words - were the events of the world more predictable. One may say that because of their fundamental constitution human beings have inborn (hereditary) vested interests in an orderly structured world free of mysteries and surprises.' (Bauman 1995, 141.)

Among other sources of confusion and complexity, the late 20th century is marked by the concurrence of conflicting processes of integration and fragmentation in the social and political spheres. Ever intensifying globalization has not made the world a smaller place, as predicted by some who interpret the notion in a tautological fashion as 'rendering world-wide' and emphasise factors such as technological advance that allows for quasi-instantaneous communication and information across the world, yet it has certainly made it a different place-a place where identity, space, locality, distance and regionality are in a constant state of flux. It has provided us with more questions than answers in providing social actors with more opportunities for action, though with vastly differing degrees of success. Which opportunities for action should one take? Which goals are worth pursuing through action in social movements? Regional actors are no exception in this regard - though they have become more relevant as people search for a firm base for their identities and though regions are faced with new routes to influence and opportunities for articulating the 'regional voice', the degree of success in terms of policy outcomes often remains questionable. The social and political trends have made local and regional spheres of action ever more important, as crucial questions relating to our future (identity, environment, social issues) impact on the local and regional spheres with particular intensity. The assumption that the state is the dominant unit of analysis and acts as the main provider of social goods has come under threat, necessitating a re-consideration of local and regional survival systems, within which social goods are distributed and social structures embedded in ways that provide the individual with security and social goods, as well as the social networks required. Citizens still have various claims and needs regarding political participation and representation, physical protection, economic and social security, cultural belonging and identity that used to be provided by the state. However the global system that includes states, and supra- and sub-national regional entities, as well as transnational corporations, no longer presents a logical hierarchy that would make these needs the state's responsibility or endow it with the means to provide them. This makes it increasingly difficult for citizens to have their basic needs and demands fulfilled within the current system. (Axtmann 1998, 10; Rosenau 1997.) For regions these changes imply a need for adaptation, but also for empowerment and transformation allowing regions to play an active part in European regional development. This process of 'fragmegration' (Rosenau 1997, 38-39) is also at work in the Baltic Sea Region, with intense social, political and economic transformations taking place.

The European Union represents the framework in which these changes occur (in Member States and those attending accession). It is a unique political environment with a direct impact on the construction of the regional condition. This becomes apparent through the analysis of scenarios for the regional tier in the European sphere and the subsequent strategies for action available for regional actors. The scenarios outlined in this paper (1) 'Federal Europe', (2) 'Intergovernmental Europe', (3) 'Concentric Circles' and (4) 'Multi-level Europe' together suggest alternatives for regional development and empowerment namely: (1) competition strategy (placing particular emphasis on interest representation, differentiation and clustering), (2) political mobilisation strategy (accentuating the role of traditional institutional routes to influence) and (3) counter-strategy (introverted nationalistic or regionalist strategies of exclusion, but also potentially more constructive strategies of social transformation). Each has its implications for the construction of regional, as well as individual and social roles and identities. Most importantly for the theme at hand they are each embedded in a consensus building process at the national, as well as supra-national level.

Regional actors, their environment, identity and interests are influenced by the nature and degree of Europeanisation. This process is manifest in a greater awareness of European legislation, a growing willingness and ability to mobilise resources in the search of European finance, increasing co-operating with other European local and regional authorities and expert agencies, direct lobbying of EU institutions, and the influence of EU ideas on sub-national policy making. (John 1994, Goldsmith 1997 and Kohler-Koch 1998.) Europeanisation is a factor that at the same time conditions the behaviour of regional actors and their strategy choices, and is conditioned by them. The question addressed in this paper is how can the long-term perspective in regional planning benefit from trans-national connections and the empowerment of regional actors through a Europeanisation process, or does it only allow for adaptive strategies for regional actors to emerge? These questions are approached through the framework of scenarios in the EU context.


2. REGIONAL / LOCAL RESPONSES TO INTEGRATION: THE FINNISH CASE

The notion of globalization has often been obfuscated by attempts to draw clear boundaries around the different processes or spheres it encompasses (social, economic, political, cultural), thus implying that it can be defined in a straight forward fashion, by setting the referent in a closed framework. It needs to be acknowledged however that globalization, as many of the other concepts referred to in this paper (integration, fragmentation, localisation) are essentially contested concepts (Gallie 1955; d'Agostino 1993, 480). Because globalization is in essence an evaluative rather than strictly descriptive concept, we need to make value judgements regarding its applicability every time we use it (and thus define and re-define it in the process). Since the criteria for the application themselves often have an evaluative dimension, we cannot escape the contested nature of concepts involved. Through engaging in the debate by using and defining these concepts we engage in an exercise of operationalising them. The operationalisations however can never in themselves be universal, but rather are socially constructed. Thus the notions will only become defined (and re-defined) through the practice of using them. In this sense it may be more useful to discuss globalizations, as the particular manifestations of global social, political and economic trends understood in this context vary greatly.

It has been argued that globalization can be seen as a second-generation concept of interdependence, wider in reach, scope and intensity. The concept has however outgrown the epistemological confines of 'interdependence'. Interdependence was in essence an exercise in traditional behavioralist International Relations theorising, emphasising the need to create a model which accurately reflects the nature of the system and its constituent parts, and allows us to make predictions about the future based on the generalisations reached through our empirical work. The as yet embryonic research programme coagulating around notions of globalization has however a different epistemological focus, emphasising the need for critical social research as opposed to problem solving approaches (Cox 1981, 128-129), placing 'reflexivity' (Robertson 1992, 183) at the centre of the globalization debate.

Some further practical indications need to be given regarding the understanding of globalization used in this paper. There are three key elements that help us approach the theoretical-practical framework in which globalization and regionalization are approached here:

1. Transformative potential encompassed in regional actorness
2. The framework for action provided by the EU institutions
3. The simultaneous emergence and impact of integration and fragmentation

Questions that we need to address aim at connecting regionalization and globalization in a way that allows for empowerment of the relevant actors. The research question that emerges can thus be formulated as 'how do regionalization and globalization impact upon regional and local realities and what kind of responses emerge as a consequence'? The underlying assumption here is that the role of the regions in European political economy is of utmost importance, and there are also social and cultural responses to integration emerging that are potentially channelled through the regional route. The 'regional' thus provides one of the social spheres in which integrationary measures are implemented, thus connecting the regional to national, supranational and individual processes.

The responses we are concerned with here are those articulated in the institutional framework of the EU. Thus we do not focus on the wider social processes of identity and consensus building that underlie the formation of 'regional voice', but rather seek to understand how, and to what effect, it can be articulated in the current governance structure of the EU, and what kind of strategies are most likely to be successful in getting the 'regional voice' heard and acknowledged by other institutional actors.

Our focus will be on the Finnish regions and their presence and role in the European integration process. Though the historical and political status of regions, as well as regional administration vary greatly within the current EU Member states, and thus the opportunities for exerting influence differ accordingly, there are some general conclusions that can be drawn from the Finnish case. Though regionality does not allow for uniformity in regional strategies, there are some shared factors that influence regional mobilisation and the articulation of 'regional voice' in the EU context highlighting some important lessons to be drawn from individual experiences. It can be argued that the internal and external dynamics of mobilisation tend to coincide, occasionally conflicting, whilst at other times overlapping. What has been defined as the external mobilisation of the regions (regionalization 'from above'), most of all implemented through EU policy instruments such as the structural funds has existed side by side, though not always in a harmonious relationship with the process of internal mobilisation, described as regionalization 'from below'.

The presence and 'voice' of Finnish sub-national regional authorities and actors in the EU context helps to highlight the potential openings, but also the problems that the sub-national routes to influence entail, and the strategies that are available for these actors. The Finnish examples point to the fact that there exists direct and institutional routes to articulate the 'voice' of regional actors, but the ways of ensuring the influence of this voice in policies are not as straight-forward. The resources (human and material) of the actors still play a key part in determining the actual level of influence, and thus those with more resources are more likely to get their voice heard than those with few resources. The 'egalitarian' routes that would place all regional actors in an equal position in terms of getting their voice heard and accessing strategic power structures, such as institutions and the possibility of exerting influence by participating in debates and voting is not necessarily an effective means of influencing policy, as institutions accessible to regional actors, most of all the COR tend to have only a marginal role to play in final decision-making (Christiansen 1996). Hasty judgements should however be avoided in the case of the COR, which is not only marked by the same dynamism as the whole EU structure, but more particularly can be seen as an evolving organisation still in the early stages of the process of constituting its role as part of the EU governance structure. Though expectations are not particularly high regarding its relevance, it is however seen as an important forum for discussion and if it can provide expertise on regional issues for wider use in the EU sphere, it can become a key actor in articulating the 'regional voice' and influencing policies that affect regions.

The routes to influence indicate the opportunities for regional actors to influence policy making in the EU context. The direct route encompasses the 'lobbying' activities and co-operation schemes that link regional actors directly to other corresponding spheres of action in the EU context, as well as to EU institutions. The institutional route is provided by the EU institutions in which regional actors and representatives have a role to play (most importantly the Committee of the Regions, but also potentially the European Parliament). The constitutional or procedural route is formed by those rules, institutions and procedures that the EU entails regarding the role of the regions as part of the EU structure. The rules pertaining to decision-making, implementation of legislation and right of appeal can be cited as examples here. The constitutional route is, in effect, constructed from the previous two routes, as direct and institutional means of influence offer the best way for regional actors to try to increase their constitutional status within the EU structure. What equally needs to be considered is the policy impact in terms of internationalisation or Europeanisation of these regions. Structural policy includes areas that fall into this category, as many of the programmes includes networking and cross-border co-operation.

It is important to bear in mind that EU membership entails more than the far-reaching legislative requirements and the adaptation required to implement them efficiently. The political and administrative culture is also influenced in various ways. The 'Europeanisation' of regions is a complex process that is manifest in a greater awareness of European legislation, a growing willingness and ability to mobilise resources in the search for European finance, increasing co-operating with other European local and regional authorities and expert agencies, direct lobbying of EU institutions, and the influence of EU ideas on sub-national policy making (John 1994a and 1994b, Goldsmith 1997 and Kohler-Koch 1998). Ideas such as 'subsidiarity' or 'programming' have in many cases changed practices on the regional and national level in a way that has often empowered the regions in relation to central administration in Member States. This is particularly the case in Member States with centralised and hierarchical administrative traditions such as Finland. This has required changes in the way regional representatives view their role and pursue their policy goals, as more active role requires capacities for more assertive and informed actions.


FOUR FINNISH EXAMPLE REGIONS AND THEIR ROUTES TO INFLUENCE:

The relatively low level of development in the direct route and the limited institutional presence of Finnish regions in the EU would seem to confirm the assumption referred to above that the main target of influence and mobilisation still needs to be national decision making. This is particularly valid as the influence available for regional actors in the EU context in general is relatively modest. As argued above, the COR provides an important arena for negotiation and networking, but its influence in terms of EU decision making does not amount to much.

Though the Community Initiatives can be considered as falling into the 'mobilisation from above' category by their very definition, they provide an important arena for regional strategy and also for regional identity building. The case of Northern Peripheries is illustrative in this respect, as it can be seen as encompassing different regional strategies and objectives, as well as differing administrative practices. Though the programme itself is of fairly recent date (first deadline for applications under this programme was the 3 April 1998), it is based on a much longer experience acquired from co-operative links between national authorities responsible for regional policy and regional planning in the Nordic countries as well as in Scotland. It can be argued that the main push for the initiative in the end came from the Scottish side, as the prospects in terms of the reform of the structural funds seemed to suggest uncertainty for the status of Highlands and Islands as an Objective 1 Region.

Together with the establishment of the Northern Periphery Programme there has evolved a wider co-operative network in the areas of forestry, Information technology, Small and Medium Sized Enterprises and university networking (see www.scotnordic.com). Together these two have further developed existing co-operative ties between regions that share many common problems and characteristics; most obviously the sparsity of population and harsh climatic conditions, together with high environmental quality and a correspondingly high dependency on nature in economic terms (tourism, agriculture and fishing ). As was argued above, for Scotland the Northern Periphery Programme has served the purpose of sharpening its argument in support of the Highlands and Islands' Objective 1 status. In order to strengthen their argument the Scots have been keen to find ways of emphasising the similarities between the Highlands and Islands and Swedish and Finnish periphery regions, whose structural support has been viewed more secure. This can be seen as part of Highlands and Islands region's, but also of Scotland's strategy more generally, which is a combination of the three strategies referred to above. Seldom do regional strategies manifest themselves in ways that neatly fall into any single or exclusive category. The combining of these strategies in different ways for different purposes is therefore consistent with the view that interests and identities are socially constructed and fluid, thus requiring the capability to adapt one's goals and behaviour to altering circumstances.

In the case of Scotland, the competition strategy can be detected in the way in which emphasis has been placed on forging effective instruments of interest representation (creation of a distinctive 'Scottish cluster'). Concomitant with this has been the emergence of 'Scotland the Brand' that has allowed for a strong regional profile and visibility. There has also been a strong aspect of political mobilisation, apparent in the elections of May 1997 and referendum for a Scottish parliament of September 1997. The strengthening of nationalism at the expense of regionalism that endowed the adoption of Scottish devolution from London is a clear indication of a counter-strategy. Though it can be interpreted as an introverted nationalistic trend, it can equally bear elements of a more positive strategy of social transformation in emphasising distinct regional values. In any case it seems to indicate a counter-move to the regionalist strategy implemented thus far.

The distinctive nature of Scotland as a historic nation and as a strong entity within the regional interest representation ambit places it in a special position within the EU regions, allowing us to draw some conclusions that can be applied more generally. Though it is true that Scottish regions tend to be more evenly represented than their Finnish counterparts who are particularly Helsinki-centred, there are indications of clustering even in Finnish regions (the West of Finland and Ostrobothnia Offices can be cited as examples). Peripheral regions need to be strongly clustered and effectively mobilised in order to influence policies that affect them, and co-operation with similar regions is more effective than 'going it alone', as it brings both synergy and resource advantages. Though many regional offices mainly concentrate on lobbying for funds, their goals are more effectively met and they have a clearer mandate if they engage support formed by a regional consensus that sees their role important. Though the role and functions of regional offices place them more in the economic than the political sphere, political issues cannot be avoided, thus a sensitivity to them is required, even if attempts are made to remain outside the political domain. In general it can be argued that there is no such thing as a 'non-political' issue in European integration, as the EU, in itself, is a site of power. This applies to regions as well, who are not merely the objects of regional policies, but acting subjects in the integration process that has become increasingly multi-faceted and dynamic.


3. SCENARIOS

The scenario approach is used here to chart alternative paths to the future and as such it is dependent on the decisions taken, but also subject to uncertainties caused by turbulence in the political and social environment. This approach is particularly well suited to the consideration of European integration, since its historical development is firmly grounded in path-dependency. Alternative scenarios are introduced in the following table, after which we shall chart the historical paths leading to certain constellations of regional influence, that have followed particular strategic decision points in the European - regional continuum.

Traditionally regional opportunities have been weak, and the assumption has been that regional interests, as well as regional development and planning are the shared responsibility of the region in question and the national government. Gradually, as European policies affect an increasing number of issues in the regional / local environment, there has been a shift in regional influence, directed to the supra-national level, as well as the domestic political environment. It has been more widely acknowledged that regional actors need to create strategies that balance these two levels of action and influence, allowing for the maximising of 'regional voice' within the bounds provided by available resources. Regions and the EU exist in a mutually supportive and interdependent relationship in which shifts in power and influence occur together with constitutional and institutional changes. Though the regions and their representatives have limited opportunities to influence these changes, such openings do occur.


KEY ELEMENTS OF INTEGRATION SCENARIOS AND THE REGIONAL FACTOR:

The table above indicates the role of the regions in different scenarios, starting from the assumption that the level of institutionalisation and structuration of regional actors varies according to the scenario in question. The scenarios thus outlined are most importantly dependent on, not only the routes to influence of particular types of actors (sub-national in our case), but on those procedures that determine how and by whom the structures and procedures that determine these routes can be amended (Smith, B.C. 1985, 15). Thus in determining which path is chosen and what possible paths that opens up is itself determined by the constitutional set-up. This has corresponding implications for the principle that is dominant in procedural terms, as well as for the institution(s) that are of key importance for the regions in each of the scenarios. Equally the question of how to change the system is central to each of the alternative scenarios, since variations exist over what institutional and constitutional rules and procedures are involved in determining the move from one scenario to the next. Strategic decision points are the moments in which such a move becomes possible.

Transformation within the system can be the result of a disintegrationary or integrationary development. Move(s) towards federalism are a typical indication of this dual nature of change. Contrary to the view that federalism represents 'the last stage before disintegration' (Le Galès 1998, 246), federalism can be seen as a response to the threat of disintegration. If the flexibility and multi-level nature of the other scenarios leads to a motivation crisis, federalism can provide an instrument in finding the means and motivations necessary for unity. Most of all federalism can function differently in different political and historical circumstances and is thus not automatically disintegrative or integrative. As has been argued by James Anderson, rather than reducing separatist pressures, federalisation may simply provide a stronger institutional base for separatist mobilisation, as has occurred with Quebec (Anderson 1995, 285-6). Similar fears have been voiced recently in relation to Scottish devolution. When approaching the question of governance in the European Union we must take as our point of departure the very nature of the European polity; its contradictions and ambiguities as they present themselves when viewed against the backdrop of the late modernist development, with its economic and industrial trends, social and sociological changes and political shifts. Integration and regionalization are in essence part of the same process, as argued in the introductory section, and as such they cannot be dealt with if the question of European polity is left aside. These questions are approached through the scenarios that open up the realities of various political choices and contingencies for further study. Thus regionalization in its micro- and macro-forms becomes firmly embedded in the development and choices facing the European Union.

In terms of the strategic decision points through which political developments within a polity are reached it is useful to consider the historical development of that polity, since integration is a deeply path-dependent process. In order for the strategies to be applicable and functioning, there need be sufficient influence to make them institutionally relevant. Considering regional actorness and the opportunities available for regional actors to influence the development of their environment thus needs to be considered within this context. In order to clarify the question of regional voice and influence we can consider some of the decision points that have so far been relevant to the way regionality has evolved in the EU.

Some of the most important decision points include the following:

• Paris (1972) and Copenhagen European Councils (1973), which agreed on the establishment of European Regional Development Fund (ERDF).
• Tindemans Report (1975) included some key innovative ideas that have come to mark the relationship between regions and European decision making such as the 'Two Speed Europe' idea and subsidiarity.
• The establishment of the first regional office in Brussels (1984) by the city of Birmingham. (Followed by Strathclyde Region (Scotland) the following year).
• Single European Act (1985), in which regional convergence as a policy goal was made more explicit with the establishment of the Article 130A, stating that 'the Community shall aim at reducing disparities between the various regions and the backwardness of the least-favoured regions'.
• The publication of Council of Europe's European Charter of Local Self-Government' (1985), which became influential in calling for democratic local government and subsidiarity throughout Europe.
• Reform of the Structural Funds (1988), which provided a leap forward for the European regional policy in both qualitative and quantitative terms. Reform included the decision to double the size of the structural funds over a five year period and the introduction of a whole new vocabulary and motivation for regional policy through the new principles and objectives.
• Maastricht Treaty (1991), which established the first 'regional institution' in the form of the Committee of the regions (COR) and enabled the representation of regional governments in the Council of Ministers.
• Edinburgh Summit (1992), in which the EU's Cohesion Fund was established to deal with regional development in the four poorest Member States. There were also further clarifications of the guidelines relating to the application of the principle of subsidiarity.
• The COR started functioning (1994) and the 'regional voice' finally had its own institutional route (if not yet an institution in the strict sense of the word).
• The 'Pujol Report' aiming at extensive influence for the COR, for instance in the form of co-decision rights published by the COR (1995).
• Amsterdam Treaty (1997), which defined further areas in which Committee of the Regions must be heard and extended the responsibility of consultation to the European Parliament.
• Amsterdam summit of the regions and cities was organised (May 1997) as a 'regional alternative' to the Amsterdam IGC to discuss employment, enlargement and subsidiarity.
• Agenda 2000 outlined the strategy needed to face three challenges: institutional reform, enlargement and financing, of which the reform of the structural funds was part of (1997).
• Commission proposals for the reform of the structural funds tabled (18 March 1998)

These points can be seen as indicative of the types of decisions that are relevant for the paths relating to the role of regions in the EU structure and that have thus been influencing the 'regional condition' in the EU. They can often be interpreted in terms of the routes to influence discussed earlier that deal with either institutional or constitutional issues, or are relevant for the 'regional condition' and therefore to the internal and external mobilisation of the sub-national regions. In general they strengthen the assumption that the Intergovernmental conferences (IGC) are key decision-points at which all actors wishing to exert influence should concentrate their efforts. In particular major institutional and constitutional issues are decided in the IGCs and thus the need to get one's voice heard in a co-ordinated and effective way at these points is of utmost importance. Yet as we look at policies that are of particular relevance to the regions and their representatives, they evolve in a continuous process. Thus the presence and voice needs to be established in a way that allows for interest representation based on multi-level strategies at all times.


4. CONCLUSIONS

The choice regarding the alternative actions open for regional actors are dependent on resources and the nature of internal and external mobilisation. Whilst internal mobilisation is based on the aim of regional actors to find ways of articulating their identity and political goals within the institutional framework provided by the EU ('regionalization from below'), external mobilisation ('regionalization from above') represents attempts by the central government and other institutional actors to model regions and their politico-administrative organisation in a way best suited for the interest of these external forces. In the case of Europeanisation however this distinction can be more subtle, more consensual than coercive or even hierarchical. This is due to the hegemonic nature of European integration as a process and an ideology. Integration is influenced by the institutional and political elites in a way that is embedded in a wider process of social consensus building in the neo-Gramscian sense, providing for both coercion and consent, as a 'global process of decomposition and recomposition of civil societies and political authorities', involving 'movements emanating from the base of society' (Cox 1995, 44). The role of social forces (material capabilities, ideas and institutions) in this process is of utmost importance, as they determine the distribution of power within a society and the strategies adapted in different political circumstances. Regional interest representation obviously reflects these various social forces, as regional issues are not merely influenced by formal regional representatives, but equally a whole range of social and political actors involved in the integration process.

'Regional voice' is however central, as it is one that has the mandate of regional society, though not always in the form of formal democratic accountability. In order to improve the democratic accountability of the system it would be advantageous for regional actors if the EU was to develop in the direction of a federation in the sense of encompassing clear distribution of powers and democratic responsibility. This however is a controversial issue that is unlikely to get sufficient support from Member states governments, who would lose some of their power as a consequence of such a change. For the time being regional actors thus need to concentrate on developing effiective and participatory strategies to get their voice heard and to help fill the gap between the citizen and the supra-national level. If this can be achieved in a consensual environment in which the mandate of regional actors enjoys popular support, regional actors are likely to provide one element in contributing to the problems of 'fragmegration' and governance in the European sphere.


5. REFERENCES

Interviews:

The interviews conducted with the following people in April 1998 were used in writing this paper. Their assistance is gratefully acknowledged.

John Edward, Scotland Europa Office, Brussels

Harry Ekestam, Finnish Ministry of Interior, Department for Regional Development, Helsinki

Pekka Järvinen, West Finland European Office, Brussels

Keijo Sahrman, The association of Finnish Local Authorities, Brussels

Günther Schultz, Hanse-Office, Brussels

Lars Wägar, Ostrobothnia Regions, Brussels

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The Herald 6 July 1998. 'SNP set to be largest party at Holyrood'.

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